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ABSTRACT
A proof of work (PoW ) blockchain protocol distributes rewards to
its participants, called miners, according to their share of the total
computational power. Sufficiently large miners can perform selfish
mining – deviate from the protocol to gain more than their fair
share. Such systems are thus secure if all miners are smaller than a
threshold size so their best response is following the protocol.
To find the threshold, one has to identify the optimal strategy for
miners of different sizes, i.e., solve aMarkov Decision Process (MDP).
However, because of the PoW difficulty adjustment mechanism, the
miners’ utility is a non-linear ratio function. We therefore call this
an Average Reward Ratio (ARR) MDP. Sapirshtein et al. were the
first to solve ARR MDPs by solving a series of standard MDPs that
converge to the ARR MDP solution.
In this work, we present a novel technique for solving an ARR
MDP by solving a single standard MDP. The crux of our approach
is to augment the MDP such that it terminates randomly, within an
expected number of rounds. We call this Probabilistic Termination
Optimization (PTO), and the technique applies to any MDP whose
utility is a ratio function. We bound the approximation error of
PTO – it is inversely proportional to the expected number of rounds
before termination, a parameter that we control. Empirically, PTO’s
complexity is an order of magnitude lower than the state of the art.
PTO can be easily applied to different blockchains. We use it to
tighten the bound on the threshold for selfish mining in Ethereum.
1 INTRODUCTION
Proof of Work [5, 13] Blockchain Protocols secure about 80% of
the cryptocurrency market cap [4], including Bitcoin [15] and
Ethereum [2]. The operators of blockchains, called miners, aggre-
gate user transactions in blocks, and order the blocks by forming a
block chain. These are decentralized protocols, allowing anyone to
join and add blocks by proving she has performed some amount of
work – a computational task. We call the rate of work expended by
each miner its mining power and normalize the sum of all rates to
one. An attacker can thus violate the system guarantees only if she
performs more work than all other participants combined, i.e., if its
mining power is larger than 50%. With no central enforcement, the
security of a PoW blockchain relies critically on the fact that the
best response of each miner is to follow the prescribed protocol.
To incentivize the miners to follow the protocol, it rewards them
with cryptocurrency tokens for their efforts. Moreover, the rewards
incentivize entities to join the system, become miners, and work
for the rewards [6, 21]. To regulate block generation rate, the pro-
tocol automatically adjusts the difficulty, i.e., the amount of work
necessary to produce each block such that the average block rate
remains constant. Therefore, if all miners follow the protocol, they
each receive in expectation a fraction of the total reward equal to
their mining power.
The security of a blockchain protocol is thus defined by the mini-
mal (threshold) mining power above which a miner can increase her
revenue by deviating from the prescribed protocol [7, 14, 16, 17, 19].
In order to calculate the security threshold, we would like to find
the smallest miner size such that its optimal strategy is not the pre-
scribed one. A natural approach is to model the system as aMarkov
Decision Process. This is a Markov Process where in each state the
agent (miner) chooses an action, probabilistically transitioning the
system into a new state. The utility of the miners is their fraction of
the reward ratio due to the difficulty adjustment, i.e., a non-linear
utility function. We call this an Average Reward-Ratio MDP (ARR-
MDP). Unfortunately, standard MDP solution techniques are not
compatible with the non-linear utility in ARR-MDP, calling for new
solution methods.
To the best of our knowledge, Sapirshtein et al. [19] were the
first to solve an ARR-MDP (§2). Their approach is to devise a
parametrized linear utility function for the original MDP. They
perform a binary search for the value of the parameter: For each
value they solve the MDP, finding the optimal strategy for the util-
ity function. The search converges towards a parameter for which
the optimal strategy for the original ARR utility function coincides
with the optimal strategy for the parametrized utility function.
In this work, we propose a novel technique (§4), called Proba-
bilistic Termination Optimization (PTO), to solve an ARR-MDP by
transforming it to a conventional MDP, which we call PT-MDP. The
form of the utility in ARR-MDP is a ratio between the miner’s re-
ward and a value determined by the protocol’s adjustment scheme.
For example, in Bitcoin, the miner’s reward is the number of her
blocks divided by the total number of blocks mined by the whole
network [7, 16, 19]. Thus, ARR-MDP can be thought of as a repet-
itive process divided to epochs, where each epoch contributes a
constant amount towards the difficulty adjustment. For Bitcoin –
in each epoch the entire network mines a certain number of blocks.
The epochs are all equivalent so optimizing a single epoch gives the
best strategy for the infinite ARR-MDP. In the heart of the transfor-
mation is the idea that it suffices to optimize for epochs with a set
expected contribution. This is done by constructing PT-MDP such
that each step has a probability of terminating the process. The
probabilistic termination ensures PT-MDP has a chosen expected
amount of contribution towards the difficulty adjustment. For Bit-
coin – PT-MDP represents an epoch in which the entire network
mines x blocks in expectation.
This relaxation simplifies PT-MDP to have a linear objective
function and still provides a provably accurate approximation. We
prove (§5) the agent’s revenue for the optimal policy in the trans-
formed MDP is a good approximation for the agent’s revenue in
the original MDP. In order to prove this we first show ARR-MDP
and PT-MDP are ergodic. This allows us to use classical results [20]
for MDPs to bound the approximation error of the transformation.
We obtain a tight bound inversely proportional to the expected
number of amount of contribution chosen. This parameter provides
the ability to obtain results with an arbitrarily small approximation
error.
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One key advantage of PTO is its performance (§6) – by solving
only a single MDP its complexity is a fraction of the state of the
art. To evaluate we compare against the Optimal Selfish Mining
Strategies in Bitcoin [19] (OSM) optimizer of Sapirshtein et al. In
PTO we use Policy Iteration to optimize the MDP, while Sapirshtein
et al. used relative value iteration whose performance is inferior in
this case.We therefore compare PTO against an improved version of
OSM we denote PI OSM which uses Policy iteration. We first show
that PI OSM is significantly faster than OSM running on the same
platform. Then, to compare against PTO, which runs on a different
platform, we compare the number of linear system solutions – the
main computational bottleneck, showing an order of magnitude
reduction in PTO.
Finally, we demonstrate the ease of application of PTO by find-
ing optimal strategies in the Ethereum blockchain(§7). Ethereum’s
reward mechanism is more complicated than Bitcoin’s. It grants
partial rewards to blocks not in the chain, and counts them towards
the difficulty adjustment. We use PTO to estimate the threshold
size for a rational miner not to deviate, reducing it from 0.26 [8, 10]
to 0.2468.
We released our code of PTO along with the Bitcoin and
Ethereum models in a public GitHub repository1.
2 RELATEDWORK
Eyal and Sirer [7] were the first to show that the Bitcoin protocol
is not incentive compatible. They have demonstrated and analyzed
a strategy (called Selfish Mining or SM1) which can be used by
miners and yields higher rewards than acting honestly. Selfish
mining involves withholding newly minted blocks and violating
the longest chain rule. The existence of such a strategy rules out
the honest protocol as a Nash equilibrium.
Their analysis uses a Markov chain and gives a closed form
formula of the revenue a miner can get if she uses SM1 and the
minimal threshold for the relative computational power a miner
needs such that using SM1 is superior to following the protocol.
However, the analysis does not guarantee that a miner with a
relative power lower than the threshold cannot deviate in some
other way and profit. This means that the SM1 threshold is an
upper bound on the security threshold of the protocol (the minimal
relative power required in order to be able to deviate and profit).
Overall, this analysis implies that under the reasonable assumption
of γ = 0.5 the security threshold of Bitcoin is 0.25 at most.
Sapirshtein et al. [19] model the Bitcoin protocol as a Markov
Decision Process with a non-linear reward criterion, and propose a
solution method for approximately solving the MDP, by performing
a binary search and in each stage solving a standard MDP. Their
analysis yields an accurate approximation of the security threshold
of Bitcoin. For example, they find that for some parameters, the
threshold is as low as 0.2321.
In contrast, PTO allows using a single MDP solution to approxi-
mate the optimal strategy, reaching an arbitrarily accurate solution
with an order of magnitude lower complexity. As PTO is more effi-
cient, it is also easier to generalize it to more complex blockchain
protocols.
1https://github.com/roibarzur/pto-selfish-mining
Other work generalizes the SM1 strategy to Ethereum and an-
alyzes its revenue in order to get an upper bound on the security
threshold of Ethereum. Ritz and Zugenmaier [18] used a Monte-
Carlo simulation in order to simulate their generalized SM1 strategy
and assess its revenue. Niu and Feng [8] also generalize the SM1
strategy to Ethereum and use a theoretical analysis by a Markov
chain to calculate the revenue of the strategy. Grunspan and Pérez-
Marco [10] use a theoretical analysis involving combinatorics for
two versions of generalized SM1 strategies . Nevertheless, all of
these works analyze specific strategies and therefore can only strive
to obtain an upper bound of the security threshold. We use PTO to
estimate a tight bound using the optimal strategy.
A new technique called SquirRL [11] analyzes blockchain pro-
tocols using deep reinforcement learning. It is based on the iter-
ative MDP solution method of OSM, and uses deep-RL to find an
approximately optimal policy. SquirRL was used for Bitcoin and
Ethereum and obtained a better upper bound for the security thresh-
old of Ethereum. By observing their results for Bitcoin, they deduce
that their method typically finds solutions with revenues approxi-
mately 1-2% lower than the optimal revenue found by OSM. Due
to the neural network approximations in deep RL, the threshold
of SquirRL is only guaranteed to be an upper bound, and deriving
meaningful error bounds for their results is not possible. In contrast,
PTO converges the optimum with a bound on the approximation
error.
3 PRELIMINARIES
3.1 Markov Decision Processes
Our method is based on the theory of Markov decision processes
(MDPs), which we now review. An MDP describes a controlled
stochastic process in discrete time [22], where at time t an agent ob-
serves an environment at state st ∈ S, takes an action at ∈ A, and
subsequently the environment transitions stochastically to a new
state s ′ ∈ S, while the agent is awarded some reward Rt = Ra (s, s ′).
The transitions between states are Markovian, and denoted by:
Pr
(
st+1 = s
′ |st = s,at = a
)
= Pa (s, s ′) .
The agent’s goal is to choose actions that maximize its long-term
rewards, defined by the MDP objective function. Three objectives
that have been extensively investigated in the literature are the
discounted reward, the average reward, and the stochastic shortest
path (SSP) [1]. For all of these cases, an optimal decision making
policy (i.e., an action strategy that maximizes the objective) can
be represented as a Markov policy – a deterministic mapping from
the state space to the action space. Furthermore, several algorithms
for finding an optimal policy are known. An MDP with a specific
policy π induces a Markov chain over the states visited by the
policy. In the sequel, the notation Eπ [·] denotes an expectation
over states in the Markov chain induced by the policy π .
3.1.1 Discounted reward. In this case the reward at time t is dis-
counted by βt for some 0 < β ≤ 1, and the objective is:
R(π ) = Eπ
[
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=0
βtRt
]
.
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3.1.2 Average reward. In this case, the objective is the average
reward per step across an infinite horizon:
R(π ) = Eπ
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=0
Rt
]
.
This objective is used in OSM.
3.1.3 Stochastic shortest path. This is a similar case to discounted
reward with β = 1. However, in this case the MDP is assumed to
have a terminal absorbing state which is guaranteed to be reached
for every policy. Once this state is reached at step T the process
always stays in this state and no further reward is obtained. Thus,T
is a random stopping time, and the objective function is of the form:
R(π ) = Eπ
[ T∑
t=0
Rt
]
.
Our method PTO will make use of this objective.
Exact algorithms for solving MDPs with the objective criteria
above include value iteration and policy iteration, which are guar-
anteed to converge to an optimal policy [1]. When the state space
is too large for exact methods, reinforcement learning algorithms
such as Q-learning [1, 11] provide an approximate solution.
3.2 Markov Chains
We now recapitulate several classical Markov chain definitions and
results [20]. Henceforth, Yn denotes a Markov chain in general,
and when applicable also denotes a random variable of the state of
the Markov chain at time t . We let S denote the state space of the
Markov chain, and P denotes its transition matrix.
The hitting time of a state is a random variable of the number
of steps it takes to return to the state when starting at said state.
Formally, the hitting time of a state i by a process Yn is defined by:
τi = min{t ≥ 2 : Y1 = Yt = i} .
A period of a state is the greatest common divisor of all possible
values for its hitting time. A state is called aperiodic if its period is
equal to 1.
A recurrent state is a state for which the chain returns to with
probability 1 assuming it starts in said state. A transient state is a
state which is not recurrent. A positive recurrent state is a recurrent
state for which the expected hitting time is finite.
An irreducible chain is a chain in which for every pair of states i
and j there is a chance to transition from i to j after any number of
steps.
The following lemma is a classical result by Serfozo [20].
Lemma 1. In an irreducible chain, if one state is positive recur-
rent and/or aperiodic then all its states are positive recurrent and/or
aperiodic. In addition, the chain is called positive recurrent and/or
aperiodic.
A Markov chain which is irreducible, and its states are positive
recurrent and aperiodic is called ergodic.
A probability measure µ on S is a stationary distribution for the
Markov Chain Yn (or for P) if for all i ∈ S it holds that:
µi =
∑
j ∈S
µ jpji .
An ergodic Markov chain alway has a stationary distribution.
4 METHOD
We describe our method for computing security bounds for
blockchain protocols based on the MDP model. We begin with
a generalization (§4.1) of the Bitcoin blockchain MDP model pro-
posed by Sapirshtein et al. [19], detail model assumptions on the
MDP (§4.2) and then present our algorithm, PTO (§4.3), for solving
the MDP.
4.1 An MDP Model for PoW Blockchain
We consider an MDP with a finite state space and a finite action
space modeling a general PoW blockchain protocol with a difficulty
adjustment mechanism. The states, actions, and transitions in the
MDP depend on the particular protocol, and in Sections 6.1 and
7.1 we detail them for the cases of Bitcoin and Ethereum. The
development in this section, however, focuses on the reward in the
MDP, and is not specific to a particular protocol.
The agent is a rational miner who wants to maximize her reward
per unit of time.We assume all of the other miners in the blockchain
act as prescribed. The difficulty adjustment scheme slows down the
mining so the rational miner reward is divided by a factor deter-
mined by the difficulty of mining. We call this factor the difficulty
contribution. In Bitcoin for example, the reward is the number of
blocks the miner appends to the main chain and the difficulty con-
tribution is the number of all blocks appended [7, 19]. In Ethereum,
on the other hand, the reward of a rational miner is the sum of her
rewards from regular blocks, uncles and nephew rewards, and the
difficulty contribution is the sum of of blocks added to the main
chain and uncle blocks [10].2 In the following, we consider a gen-
eral MDP model where the agent needs to balance the rewards with
a difficulty contribution.
In our MDP, at each time step t , the agent obtains both a scalar
reward Rt – the reward of the rational miner in step t and a
scalar Dt ≥ 0 – the difficulty contribution of the entire network
at that time step. Under the difficulty adjustment scheme [7], we
model the objective function of the rational miner in the general
form:
REV = E

lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Rt
T∑
t=1
Dt

.
Note that this objective function is different from the standard
objective functions for MDPs, and henceforth we denote suchMDPs
as average reward-ratio MDPs (ARR-MDP). In particular, since the
objective is not a linear function of the reward, standard MDP
solution methods are not applicable. Our main contribution in this
work is an algorithm for approximately solving ARR-MDPs. We
note that while our focus is on the blockchain domain, our algorithm
2Ethereum introduces the concept of uncle blocks. An uncle block is a block which is
not in the main chain but is a direct descendant of another block in the main chain.
Apart from the regular block reward, Ethereum gives additional rewards to blocks
who reference uncle blocks (called nephew rewards) and to miners of referenced uncle
blocks (called uncle rewards). This is in order to compensate miners who find blocks
which end up out of the main chain due to network latency. In order to deter miners
from intentionally creating blocks meant to be uncles, Ethereum counts both regular
blocks and uncle blocks for its difficulty adjustment [18].
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and analysis apply to any ARR-MDP, which can potentially be used
in other domains.
We note that the model in [19] is in fact an ARR-MDP, where
Dt is defined as the sum of blocks mined by the agent and the rest
of the network. Thus, the analysis of OSM applies to our setting as
well. However, as we will show later, our approach leads to much
more efficient ARR-MDP algorithms.
4.2 Model Assumptions
We next describe several assumptions on the ARR-MDP that apply
in the blockchain setting, and will allow us to develop our effi-
cient solution method. We first bound the reward and difficulty
contributions.
Assumption 1. There is a constant Rmax ∈ R+ such that for any
policy π , it holds that:
∀t : |Rt | ≤ Rmax .
Assumption 2. There is a constant Dmax ∈ R+ such that for any
policy π , it holds that:
∀t : 0 ≤ Dt ≤ Dmax .
For bitcoin, the reward and the difficulty contribution symbolize
numbers of blocks added at every step, and are bounded by the
length of the longest possible fork in the network, which is reason-
ably bounded [19]. A similar reasoning also works for Ethereum.
While not necessarily relevant to the blockchain setting, we remark
that negative bounded rewards are allowed in our formulation.
Assumption 3. For any policy π , the average difficulty contribu-
tion in ARR-MDP is lower bounded by some constant ε > 0. Formally:
Eπ
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt
]
> ε .
Assumption 3 holds in any PoW blockchain protocol, as regard-
less of the agents’ actions, the rest of the network continues mining.
Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the agents’ actions do not halt
the blockchain.
Assumption 4. There is a state in ARR-MDP which is positive
recurrent for any policy π . Denote this state as the initial state or sinit.
Assumption 4 holds if we assume the miner does not have more
than 50% of the mining power, which is reasonable since otherwise
the blockchain is already compromised. Thus, the honest miners
always catch up with the rational miner, and since she cannot keep
waiting forever, she must sync with the rest of the network at some
point and get back to the initial state. A similar assumption also
appears in the analysis of OSM with the same reasoning.
4.3 Probabilistic Termination Optimization
We now present our method for solving ARR-MDPs, which we term
Probabilistic Termination Optimization (PTO). Our main observa-
tion is that we can construct an auxiliary MDP that approximates
the ARR-MDP to arbitrary precision. This auxiliary MDP is in a
standard SSP form, and can therefore be optimized using standard
methods. In the sequel, we will show how to define the auxiliary
MDP, how to solve it efficiently, and how to bound the precision of
our approximation of the true ARR-MDP.
4.3.1 The Auxiliary MDP. The intuition behind our approach is
that dividing the reward by some number H > 1 is equivalent,
in expectation, to stopping the agent from receiving the reward
with probability 1 − 1/H . Following this intuition, we define an
auxiliary MDP that has a probability of terminating the process, and
set the termination probabilities such that the stochastic shortest
path objective in the auxiliary MDP is a close approximation of the
ARR-MDP objective.
For an ARR-MDP we denote its auxiliary MDP by PT-MDP.
PT-MDP has the same state space as ARR-MDP, with an additional
terminal state with zero reward. PT-MDP is parametrized by some
chosen parameter H . At every time step t , the agent in PT-MDP
has a probability of 1 − (1 − 1H )Dt , to transition to the terminal
state. If termination has not occurred, then the transition occurs as
in ARR-MDP.
Let Term(H ) be a random variable indicating the step in which
the process moves to the terminal state. Then the objective function
of PT-MDP is the stochastic shortest path criterion (multiplied by
a constant):
REVPT(H ) = E

1
H
Term(H )∑
t=0
Rt
 .
Note that the probability of termination depends on Dt , and the
higher Dt is, the higher the chance to terminate. Intuitively, this
encourages the agent to strike a balance between the reward and
the difficulty contribution. We call H the expected horizon since, as
we will formally show later, it corresponds to the expected total
difficulty contribution until termination.
4.3.2 Solving the MDPs. To solve PT-MDP, we can use any stan-
dard SSP algorithm, such as value iteration or policy iteration. As-
sumption 3 ensures that there will always be a positive chance of
termination in PT-MDP, a condition that guarantees that running
any of these algorithms will result in an approximately optimal
policy π [1]. This policy can be directly applied to the ARR-MDP,
as the states and actions in PT-MDP and ARR-MDP are the same
(up to the terminal state, which is not relevant for the policy). We
emphasize that our goal is to analyze the revenue in the original
ARR-MDP. To do this, we calculate the steady-state distribution of
the Markov chain induced by the policy π in ARR-MDP, and based
on this distribution calculate the expected reward
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Rt
]
,
and expected difficulty contribution
E
[
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt
]
.
The revenue is then the ratio between these two values [19].
5 PROOF OF OPTIMALITY
We next prove that PTO converges to the optimal solution of ARR-
MDP. We bound the difference in revenue between ARR-MDP
and PT-MDP and show that it can be made arbitrarily small.
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To specify our result we first need some notation. Denote the
revenue of the rational miner in ARR-MDP under policy π by
REVπARR ≜ E
π

lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Rt
T∑
t=1
Dt

.
At every step t , Xt is a random variable indicating whether the
process PT-MDP terminated at this step, that is,
Xt ≜

1 w.p
(
1 − 1H
)Dt
(continue)
0 w.p 1 −
(
1 − 1H
)Dt
(stop)
.
Denote the first time at which PT-MDP terminates by
Term(H ) ≜ argmin
t
{Xt = 0} .
Denote the revenue of the rational miner in PT-MDP under
policy π as by
REVπPT(H ) ≜ Eπ

1
H
Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
 .
Our main theorem bounds the difference in revenue for the
same policy in ARR-MDP and PT-MDP, showing it is linear in 1H .
Formally,
Theorem 2. Under Assumptions 1–4, for any policy π , the approx-
imation error of PTO is bounded,REVπARR − REVπPT(H ) = O ( 1H ) .
It follows directly that when optimizing PT-MDP, asH →∞, the
revenue of the optimal policy of PT-MDP converges to the revenue
of the optimal policy in ARR-MDP.
Corollary 3. Under Assumptions 1–4, for any policy π , it holds
that:
lim
H→∞maxπ REV
π
PT(H ) = maxπ REV
π
ARR .
In order to prove Theorem 2, we begin with necessary no-
tation (§5.1) and then show that ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are
ergodic (§5.2). Afterwards, we present the expected horizon
lemma (§5.3), which shows that when PT-MDP terminates, the
difficulty contribution is approximately H . We then bound the
difference in average reward and average difficulty contribution
between REVARR and REVPT (§5.4). Later, we simplify the expres-
sions for REVARR and REVPT (§5.5), and finally conclude by proving
Theorem 2 (§5.6).
5.1 Notation
From now on until the end of the proof, when considering either
ARR-MDP or PT-MDP, we will assume a fixed policy π . This means
that the MDPs are reduced to Markov chains as any action the
agent takes is determined by π .
Denote by sterm the terminal state of PT-MDP. Denote by P(i, j)
the chance to transition to state j when ARR-MDP is in state i , so P
is the transition matrix of ARR-MDP. Denote by P ′H (i, j) the chance
to transition to state j when PT-MDP with parameter H is in state i ,
so P ′H is the transition matrix of PT-MDP. Also denote by R(i, j) the
reward in ARR-MDP when transitioning from state i to state j and
D(i, j) as the difficulty contribution of the same transition. Note that
R(i, j) and D(i, j) are equivalent in ARR-MDP and PT-MDP since
only the transition probabilities were changed.
Denote the expected reward after state i in ARR-MDP by
Rˆ(i) ≜
∑
j ∈S
R(i, j)P(i, j) .
Denote the expected reward after state i in PT-MDP by
Rˆ′H (i) ≜
∑
j ∈S
R(i, j)P ′H (i, j) .
Denote the expected difficulty contribution after state i in
ARR-MDP by
Dˆ(i) ≜
∑
j ∈S
D(i, j)P(i, j) .
Denote the expected difficulty contribution after state i
in PT-MDP by
Dˆ ′H (i) ≜
∑
j ∈S
D(i, j)P ′H (i, j) .
We will also use matrix and vector notations for all functions
of the state (e.g. P , Rˆ, etc.) while regarding all vectors as column
vectors and denote the dot product as ⟨·, ·⟩ when summing over the
state space.
We will next see that ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are ergodic and
this implies they have stationary distributions. We denote the sta-
tionary distributions for ARR-MDP and PT-MDP as µ and µ ′H , re-
spectively.
A classical result based on theMDP ergodicity [20] can be used to
simplify the average reward/difficulty contribution per step in both
ARR-MDP and PT-MDP. The average reward per step in ARR-MDP
is ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩, the average reward per step in PT-MDP is ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩, the
average difficulty contribution per step in ARR-MDP is ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩, and
the average difficulty contribution per step in PT-MDP is ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩.
5.2 Proof of Ergodicity
In order to use classical results regarding ergodic Markov chains,
we prove ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are ergodic.
Lemma 4. It holds that ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are ergodic.
Proof. In this proof, to use ergodicity results, we will assume
that once the agent in PT-MDP terminates and enters sterm, the
process next transitions to sinit and restarts. This transition happens
w.p 1 and does incur any reward or contribution to the difficulty.
This trick does not change our results (which only concern the
rewards until the first termination), and is only for mathematical
convenience.
First, we can say that ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are irreducible
w.l.o.g because we can ignore all the states that are unreachable
from sinit and any transient states before it. This does not change the
reward criteria since transient states do not affect average rewards
as they only occur a finite amount of times and unreachable states
do not occur at all.
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From Assumption 4, sinit is positive recurrent in ARR-MDP.
The trick to restart PT-MDP, combined with Assumption 3 imply
that sinit is positive recurrent in PT-MDP as well.
In addition, We can say that both ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are
aperiodic w.l.o.g because we can take the positive recurrent state
and change it to have a chance to transition to itself with no reward
and no difficulty contribution. This does not change REVARR or
REVPT at all since this just means that the game may halt for a few
steps and then carry on normally. But, this change ensures the state
has a period of 1.
Since bothMDPs are irreducible and there is an aperiodic positive
recurrent state, Lemma 1 gives that all the states are aperiodic and
positive recurrent, showing that the MDPs are irreducible and all
their states are aperiodic positive recurrent, and therefore ergodic.
□
5.3 Expected Horizon Lemma
This following lemma shows that for H ≫ Dmax, the expected
sum of the difficulty contribution from the start of the process until
termination is a close approximation ofH , explaining whywe callH
the expected horizon. This result also explains the intuition behind
the choice of REVPT – instead of dividing by the actual difficulty
contribution, we divide by the expected difficulty contribution.
Lemma 5. The expected total contribution to the difficulty when
PT-MDP terminates is equal to H up to Dmax + 1. Formally, it holds
that: E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
 − H
 ≤ Dmax + 1 .
We defer the proof to Appendix A.1.
5.4 Bounding the Average Difference
The next lemma bounds the difference of the average re-
ward/difficulty contribution per step in ARR-MDP and PT-MDP.
Lemma 6. The expected reward per step of ARR-MDP and PT-MDP
are equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it holds that:⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = O ( 1H ) .
Furthermore, The expected difficulty contribution per step of
ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are also equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it
holds that: ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = O ( 1H ) .
Here we present a short lemma, which uses the previous the
lower bound the average difficult contribution per step of both
ARR-MDP and PT-MDP.
Lemma 7. The average difficulty contribution per step in ARR-MDP
and PT-MDP is more than some constant ε > 0. Formally, it holds that
⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ > ε ,
and
⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ > ε .
The proof are deferred to Appendix A.2.
5.5 Simplifying the Revenue
The following lemmas are the first direct steps towards bounding
the approximation error.
Lemma 8. The revenue in ARR-MDP is equal to the average ex-
pected reward per step divided by the average expected difficulty
contribution per step. Formally, it holds that:
REVARR =
⟨Rˆ, µ⟩
⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ .
Lemma 9. The revenue in PT-MDP is equal to the average expected
reward per step divided by the average expected difficulty contribution
per step up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it holds that:REVPT − ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩
 = O ( 1H ) .
The proofs are deferred to Appendix A.3.
5.6 Completing the Proof
We are now ready to prove our main result, Theorem 2:
Proof. We first bound the difference of the simplified forms in
Lemmas 8 and 9. ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩⟨Dˆ, µ⟩
 =
 ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩

Then, we use Lemma 7 to lower bound the denominators. ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩⟨Dˆ, µ⟩
 =
=
 ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩
 ≤
≤ ε−2 ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ ≤
≤ ε−2⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩+
+ ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩
 ≤
≤ ε−2
(⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩) · ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩+
+
⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ · (⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩)
We now use the fact that stationary distributions sum to 1 and
Assumptions 1 and 2 to: ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩⟨Dˆ, µ⟩
 ≤
≤ ε−2·⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩·Dmax+ε−2·Rmax·⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ .
Then, using Lemma 6, ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩⟨Dˆ, µ⟩
 ≤
≤ ε−2 ·O
(
1
H
)
· Dmax + ε−2 · Rmax ·O
(
1
H
)
.
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Overall, by using the triangle inequality for the bound we obtained
above and Lemmas 8 and 9 we deduce:
|REVPT(H ) − REVARR | = O
(
1
H
)
. □
6 PERFORMANCE
Having proven the theoretical approximation error, we proceed to
evaluate the practical performance of PTO by comparing it against
OSM. In order to do so we evaluate the running time of both meth-
ods for Bitcoin by using existing code of OSM for Bitcoin [24]. We
begin with an overview of the MDP model for Bitcoin (§6.1). We
validate the results of our implementation (§6.2), slightly improv-
ing the known threshold for Bitcoin. We investigate the effects
of different hyperparameters on the optimal revenue obtained by
PTO (§6.3). Finally, we compare the running times of PTO and OSM
and show PTO to be about 10 times faster (§6.4).
6.1 Bitcoin Model
The ARR-MDP for bitcoin is similar to the model of Sapirshtein
et al. [19]. We first describe 3 important parameters for the model,
then describe the action space, the state space and the transitions.
As in a general blockchain protocol, there is a rational miner
who wants to maximize her revenue. The rest of the network is
represented by honest miners who follow the prescribed protocol.
We assume the objective function is the ratio between the num-
ber of blocks of the rational miner and the total number of blocks
of the entire network. Because Bitcoin is a PoW blockchain, the
relative mining power determines the probability of the miner to
mine a new block. We denote this parameter α ∈ [0, 12 ).
The Bitcoin protocol specifies that in the case of a tie in the
longest chain rule, the tie is decided in favor of the first chain
the miner saw. In case of a tie between the rational miner’s chain
and some other chain, we assume the rational miner’s block is
received first by a fraction γ ∈ [0, 1] of the network. This is called
the rushing level of the miner and determines what fraction of the
honest miners will keep mining on top of the rational miner’s chain.
This determines the probability that the next block will be mined
on top of the miner’s chain and then her chain will be chosen by
all.
We assume that the miner mines on a single secret chain and that
the miner will not choose to challenge blocks before the last fork –
the blocks following the last block common to both the miner’s
chain and the current public chain, as in [19]. We also assume forks
between honest miners never occur as in [7, 16, 19].
Denote by a the length of the miner’s secret chain. Denote by h
the number of blocks in the public chain since the last fork. In order
to obtain a finite state space MDP, we cannot consider all possible
strategies of the rational miner. We assume there is a maximum
possible length for both a and h as in [19]. We call this bound the
maximum fork length.
6.1.1 Action Space. Wenow describe the possible actions theminer
can choose.
(1) Adopt – The miner chooses to abandon her private chain
and accept the current public chain.
(2) Override – The miner reveals the first h + 1 blocks from her
private chain and overtakes the public chain. This action is
possible only when a > h.
(3) Match – The miner reveals the first h blocks of her private
chain and matches the public chain. This action is possible
only when a = h and when the last block mined was by
someone other than the miner. This symbolizes the case
where the miner hears about a newly mined block and then
quickly reveals a block of the same height mined in advance.
This triggers a split in the network determined by theminer’s
rushing level. Each honest miner chooses to mine on the first
chain she sees.
(4) Wait – The miner does not reveal blocks and keeps mining
on her private chain.
6.1.2 State Space. The match action gives 3 cases for the current
state, which need to be differentiated.
(1) Irrelevant – The last block was mined by the rational miner.
Match cannot be performed because the miner just mined a
block so she does not have a block prepared in advance.
(2) Relevant – The last block was mined by an honest miner.
Match can be performed if a ≥ h.
(3) Active –Match was already performed and the network is
split so match cannot be performed again.
Denote by fork the state of the system from this list. Then, the states
in the MDP are represented by a vector with 3 elements: (a,h, fork).
6.1.3 Transitions. If the miner chooses to wait when fork is not
active, either a increases by 1 w.p α or h increases by 1 w.p 1 − α
and fork is updated to irrelevant or relevant respectively.
If the miner chooses to adopt, both a and h become 0 and Dt = h
as the miner chooses to accept h blocks. Otherwise, if the miner
chooses to override, a ← a − h − 1, h ← 0 and Rt = Dt = h + 1 as
the miner appends h + 1 blocks to the blockchain.
If the miner chooses tomatch, fork ← active as the miner causes
a fork in the network. If the miner chooses to wait when fork is
active either:
(1) a increases by 1 w.p α as the rational miner mines a new
secret block,
(2) a ← a − h, h ← 1 and fork ← relevant w.p αγ as an honest
minermines on top of the rational miner’s chain, thus solving
the fork and providing Rt = Dt = h, or,
(3) h ← h + 1 and fork ← relevant w.p α(1 − γ ) as an honest
miner mines on top of the public chain.
In order to enforce the maximum fork length, for certain states
we forbid actions which may lead to a or h increasing too much.
Note that, blocks mined are counted towards the reward and the
difficulty contribution if and when both the rational miner and the
rest of the network accept them.
6.2 Optimal Strategies
To validate PTO, we compare the revenue of the optimal strategy
found by PTO against the state of the art OSM [19]. We compare
for different α ’s and γ = 0, with a maximum fork length of 95,
similar to OSM. We choose expected horizon to be H = 106 and
we use policy iteration (for SSP) with a stopping threshold of 10−5.
7
Power (α ) PTO Revenue (REVARR) OSM Revenue
1/3 0.337 05 0.337 05
0.35 0.370 77 0.370 77
0.375 0.426 00 0.426 00
0.4 0.488 66 0.488 66
0.425 0.568 09 0.568 08
0.45 0.668 94 0.668 91
0.475 0.801 84 0.801 72
Table 1: Comparison between PTOwith policy iteration and
OSM [19] for Bitcoin when limiting the maximum fork
length to 95 and using γ = 0.
The stopping threshold is a parameter for policy iteration which
specifies the desired approximation error for the algorithm [1].
Table 1 summarizes the results. As expected, PTO reproduces the
results of OSM. Furthermore, some results for PTO are higher than
the results for OSM by more than the 10−5 approximation error.
This is due to a bug in the original OSM code. For these values, OSM
stopped by mistake after hitting a hard-coded maximal number of
iterations. We removed the redundant stopping condition before
comparing the running times.
6.3 Hyperparameters
We empirically analyze the effect PTO’s hyperparameters.
6.3.1 Expected Horizon. We first consider the expected horizon. In
order to do so, we experiment with Bitcoin for several values of α ,
with γ = 0.5, with a fixed maximum fork length of 50 and using
policy iteration with a stopping threshold of 10−5.
Figure 1 plots the revenue of the policy found against the horizon
length H . The figure shows that as the expected horizon increases,
the revenue converges to the revenue of the optimal policy. Since
different α ’s were considered, all the revenues for each α were
normalized by the best revenue achieved by PTO for said α .
The graph shows that as the expected horizon is increased, the
approximate revenue converges quickly to its optimal value, as
supported by Theorem 2.
Intuitively, one might expect that for higher values of α , our
method would require higher values of H to converge, since more
powerful miners are more capable of creating longer forks, and
thus should require more consideration towards future blocks by
looking into a further expected horizon.
Our results in Figure 1 indicate that this is not necessarily the
case. We attribute this find to the fact that different values of α
have different optimal policies, and thus are affected differently by
the expected horizon.
Note. A drawback of PTO when compared to OSM is that al-
though the approximation error in PTO is tight and decreases lin-
early with the expected horizon, it is not known in advance. OSM,
on the other hand, takes the approximation error as a parameter and
outputs an ε-optimal policy. However, as we see in Figure 1, choos-
ing a reasonable expected horizon such as 106 ensures a negligible
approximation error.
Figure 1: The effect of the expected horizon H . We plot re-
sults for Bitcoin with different α ’s, γ = 0.5, and maximum
fork of 50, normalized by the maximum revenue achieved
for each α .
Figure 2: The effect of the maximum fork length. We plot
results for Bitcoin with different α ’s, γ = 0.5 and H = 104,
normalized by the maximum revenue achieved for each α .
6.3.2 Maximum Fork Length. We next investigate the effect of the
maximum fork length. We experiment with Bitcoin for several
values of α , with a fixed expected horizon of 104, and using policy
iteration with a stopping threshold of 10−5. The revenues obtained
are presented in Figure 2, normalized for different α as above. As the
maximum fork is increased, the agent has more possible actions in
the game, and thus the revenue is non decreasing, as clearly evident
in the figure. In addition, the higher α is, the higher the maximum
fork length needed to achieve the same approximation, as evident
in the figure by the dependence of the fork length required to reach
optimal performance on α .
The maximum fork length enables the model to disregard pos-
sible policies which allow forks longer than some threshold. This
ensures the state space is finite and enables us to use PTO. Ignoring
feasible policies seemingly hurts the optimality of our results. How-
ever, we ignore longer forks because the probability of the miner
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Figure 3: (a): Comparison of the running time of the 3 meth-
ods for different maximum fork lengths. The maximum
fork length determines the number of states in the model.
(b): Comparison of the number of times a linear system
was solved. This enables comparison of the 2 methods even
though they run on different environments. (c): Comparison
of the revenues obtained by the 3 methods. PTO achieves
similar results to both other methods.
to obtain such a fork declines exponentially with the fork length.
Therefore, considering a large enough maximum fork length such
as 100 is more than enough to obtain a good approximation; increas-
ing it further yields negligible improvement, as shown empirically
in Figure 2.
6.4 Running Time
We show that PTO with policy iteration is faster than OSM. We
compare the methods for different maximum allowed fork lengths
in order to compare the methods for different sizes of the state space.
This allows us to conjecture about the efficiency of generalizing
the methods to other blockchains with larger state spaces (e.g.,
Ethereum). In order to perform the comparison, we use the OSM
code generously shared by Ren Zhang [24].
Running time heavily depends on the low level implementation
and platform. Instead, we compare the number of linear system
that each method solves. However, this comparison too depends on
the dynamic programming algorithm used to solve the (standard)
MDPs. We found that in contrast to the relative value iteration used
in the original OSM work, the policy iteration algorithm works
significantly better both for OSM and PTO.
We therefore improved OSM to use policy iteration (for the
average reward criterion) instead of relative value iteration, and we
call this implementation Policy-Iteration OSM (PI-OSM). Figure 3(a)
shows PI-OSM has a shorter running time than OSM when run
in the same environment. Next, we compare the number of linear
systems solved for PTO and for PI-OSM. Figure 3(b) shows that
the number of linear systems solved for PTO is about one order of
magnitude smaller than PI-OSM.
When solving MDPs there is a trade off between accuracy and
running time. For a fair comparison, we made sure that PTO was
at least as accurate as OSM and PI-OSM. Figure 3(c) shows that
the results obtained by all methods were of similar accuracy (up to
about 10−6).
7 ETHEREUM
After evaluating the performance of PTO we now move on to
find optimal strategies in Ethereum. We first describe our MDP
model for Bitcoin (§7.1). We then present the results of PTO for
Ethereum and compare them to the approximately optimal results
of SquirRL (§7.2). Finally, we describe our derivation of the security
threshold for Ethereum (§7.3).
7.1 Model
We now describe an ARR-MDP model for Ethereum [2, 23].
A full implementation is available in the GitHub repository.
We describe the relevant differences from Bitcoin. Then, we
describe the action space, the state space and the transitions of the
ARR-MDP.
The basic mechanics of the protocol are similar – in both sys-
tems miners generate blocks that form a graph. As in Bitcoin, the
relative mining power α and the maximum fork length will play an
important part.
As in Bitcoin, Ethereum’s blockchain is the longest chain of
blocks. However, ties are broken uniformly at random. So, the
miner’s rushing level does not play a role in Ethereum and we can
assume a constant γ = 0.5.
Ethereum presents the concept of uncle blocks [2]. In order to
compensate a miner of a block that ended up out of the main chain,
Ethereum introduces additional rewards, as follows. A block in the
main the chain may reference a previous block, called an uncle
block, if it is a direct child of a previous block in the main chain. In
this context, the referencing block is called a nephew block. A block
can reference up to 2 such uncle blocks.
The miner of the uncle block receives an uncle reward [18]. This
reward depends on the uncle distance, that is, the number blocks in
the chain from the last fork to the nephew block. The uncle reward
starts at 78 of the regular block reward if the nephew is the first
block since the last fork between the nephew’s chain and the uncle
block, we refer to this as an uncle with a distance of 1. The reward
decreases by 18 for any additional block between the last fork and
the nephew down to 28 of the regular block reward. This happens
when the nephew is the 6th block since the last fork as an uncle
distance of more than 6 is not allowed.
The miner of the nephew block receives a nephew reward in
addition to the regular block reward. This is in contrast to receiving
only the block reward in Bitcoin. The nephew reward is equal to 132
of the regular block reward.
Originally, Ethereum did not count uncles for its difficulty ad-
justment mechanism. However, it allowed strategies which directly
exploit this to intentionally create blocks destined to become un-
cles [18].
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In order to deter miners from doing so, Ethereum was updated
to take into account uncle blocks for the difficulty [3]. However
for its code’s backwards compatibility, the actual implementation
specifies that in the case the block references either one or two
uncles, the block and its uncles count only as 2 blocks towards the
difficulty adjustment. This allows situations in which 3 blocks in
total count into the difficulty adjustment as 2 blocks. This is instead
of the change which was originally intended.
In the model, we follow the intended mechanism and assume
that any uncle counts as 1 block regardless of whether 2 uncles
were referenced by a single block. This is in line with other previous
works [10, 18].
The Ethereum protocol specifies that honest miners reference
all available uncle blocks which were not referenced before, and
do so in order – reference further uncles first [23]. Therefore, the
honest miners reference all possible uncles, including blocks by the
rational miner.
The rational miner however, can choose which blocks to refer-
ence as uncles. Since when referencing an uncle the nephew reward
is dwarfed by the resulting contribution to the difficulty, we restrict
the rational miner to only reference her own blocks as uncles when
possible as in [11].
7.1.1 Action Space. The Ethereummodel uses the 4 actions defined
in the Bitcoin model: adopt, override, match, wait.
We also introduce a new action available to the rational miner.
If a > 0 andh > 1, the miner may reveal the first block of her private
chain to be included as an uncle unless it was already revealed
previously.
Revealing additional blocks will not achieve anything as an uncle
has to be direct child of a block in the main chain. Therefore, we
assume the miner never reveals more than one block except for
when she chooses to override or match.
7.1.2 State Space. Same as for the Bitcoin model, denote by a the
length of the miner’s secret chain and by h the number of blocks in
the public chain since the last fork.
Because of the change to the prescribed policy in a case of a tie
in the longest chain rule, the match action now gives only 2 cases
for the current state [11, 19].
(1) Relevant –Match can be performed if a ≥ h.
(2) Active –Match was already performed and the network is
split so match cannot be performed again.
Denote fork as the current case of the system as described above.
We now move on to describe how to capture the state regarding
the uncle blocks.We distinguish between the rationalminer’s blocks
and blocks mined by other miners.
Let uh be a binary vector of length 6 denoting whether there are
blocks by honest miners since the last fork that can be included
as uncles. uh registers only the last 6 possible uncles since further
uncles are not allowed to be included. Each entry i in this vector
denotes whether there is possible block to be included as an uncle
with distance i in the first block after the last fork between the ratio-
nal’s miner chain and the public chain. Note that this is a different
fork than the one between the possible uncle and its nephew.
We use two variables to denote the rational miner’s uncle state.
Let r denote the length of the public chain since the last fork when
m1 m2 m3 m4 m5 m6 m7
p2 p3 p5 p6 p7
Figure 4: An example state for Ethereum. Blocks mined by
honest miners are marked by pi . Dashed lines present un-
cle references and only appear for p6 and p7. Blocks mined
by the rational miner are marked by mi . Secret blocks are
marked by a dashed outline.
p1 p2 p3 p4 p5
m2 m4
Figure 5: An example state for Ethereum. This figure is with
the same conventions as in Figure 4. Each of the blocks p2, p3
and p4 references 2 uncles previous to block p1.
the rational miner revealed the first block of her secret chain mi-
nus 1 (h− 1) or 0 if it is still a secret. If the miner’s first block will be
included as an uncle, r specifies its uncles distance. This is because
the miner’s first block since the last fork cannot be referenced be-
fore as it was still a secret when the first r + 1 public blocks since
the last fork have been published.
In addition, letua denote whether there is a revealed block by the
rational miner from before the last fork which was not referenced
as an uncle before. ua will serve only to denote whether there is
a potential uncle block pending from before the last fork. Unlike
r or uh , it does not capture its uncle distance since we count its
reward and difficulty contribution immediately after the its fork is
resolved. We can do this since we know for sure that this block will
be referenced as the rational miner references her own blocks and
the rest of the network reference all potential uncles.
The states in the MDP are represented by a vector with 6 ele-
ments: (a,h, fork, r ,ua ,uh ).
Figures 4 and 5 give 2 examples of possible states. In Figure 4, p6
andm6 are the last fork. As there are 2 blocks in each chain since the
last fork, a = 2 and h = 2. There are 3 uncle references marked: the
block p6 references uncles p2 and p3 with uncles distances of 4 and 3
respectively and the blockp7 references the unclep5 with a distance
of 2. The honest uncles vector uh is equal to (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 0) because
it captures the distance of previous uncles with respect to the last
fork. As the miner’s blocks are secret, r = 0. If the miner chooses to
reveal then r would become 1. Because there are no potential uncle
blocks of the rational miner before the last fork, ua = 0.
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In Figure 5, p4 andm4 are the last fork, a = 1 and h = 2. The
honest uncles vector uh does not include the uncles already refer-
enced by p2 and p3 as these uncles were already referenced before
the last fork. It includes only the uncles referenced by p4. However
as the figure does not show the distances of those uncles uh is
ambiguous. As the miner’s block is secret, r = 0. Asm2 is revealed,
it is a pending uncle block of the rational miner which was mined
before the last fork, thus ua = 1.
Figure 5 also demonstrates why there can be at most 1 pending
uncle block of the rational miner before the last fork. The only
case in which there could be a pending uncle block is when the
miner has at least 1 revealed block, chooses to adopt and if all
the blocks in the public chain reference previous uncle blocks and
there is no room left for referencing the rational miner’s block.
For there to be 2 pending uncle blocks, this would have to happen
twice. However, if a ≤ 1, the rational miner would never choose
to adopt unless h ≥ 2. As if h < 2 match or override are strictly
more profitable. So, there would have to be at least 4 blocks which
all reference previous uncles in uh . But, this is not possible. Since
we assume forks between the honest miners never occur, and as
each block can reference 2 uncles, 3 honest blocks are enough to
reference all the 6 previous uncles of uh . This means the rational
miner’s block can be referenced in the 4th block (p5).
7.1.3 Transitions. The transitions in Bitcoin leading to changes
in a, h and fork are similar in Ethereum. We now describe how the
transitions change r , ua and uh .
If the miner chooses to wait when fork is not active, the informa-
tion stays the same. If the miner chooses to reveal then r ← h − 1.
If the miner chooses to match when fork is relevant then also
r ← h − 1.
If the miner chooses to adopt, then the public chain of length h
is accepted and all possible uncles inua anduh might be referenced.
If r > 0 then the first block of the rational miner’s chain can also
be referenced.
The actual number of uncles referenced depends on h as each
block has a maximum of 2 possible uncles to reference. All ref-
erenced uncles are removed from uh and the remaining possible
uncles in uh are shifted back by h. Also, ua ← 0. If r > 0 and the
miner’s first block was not referenced then we mark ua ← 1 to
remember this uncle still has to be referenced and then set r ← 0.
The difficulty contribution is then the number of blocks h plus the
number of uncle blocks referenced.
If r was more than 0, we reward the miner with a relevant uncle
reward assuming it will be referenced in the first block of the next
fork. This happens even if the miner’s uncle block was currently
not included. This block also counts for the difficulty contribution
regardless.
If ua was 1 and at least 2 honest uncle blocks were included, this
means that we counted the uncle reward of the pending uncle based
on a shorter uncle distance. We correct this by fining the miner by
1
8 . An example of this case is if the miner chooses to adopt after
the state illustrated in Figure 5.
If the miner chooses to override, all the uncles in uh are shifted
back by h + 1. Also, r ← 0 and ua ← 0, as the miner appends h + 1
blocks to the blockchain. If ua was 1 before, we give the miner a
Power (α ) Revenue (REVARR)
0.25 0.250 705
0.275 0.282 596
0.3 0.317 798
0.325 0.359 305
0.35 0.407 925
0.375 0.465 532
0.4 0.534 359
0.425 0.618 737
0.45 0.718 527
0.475 0.826 861
Table 2: PTO results for EthereumwhenH = 105 and limiting
the maximum fork length to 20.
nephew reward as well and add 1 to the difficulty contribution in
addition to h + 1 as described in the Bitcoin model.
If the miner chooses to wait when fork is active, and if the next
mined block is by the rational miner or by an honest miner who
extends the public chain no blocks become accepted by everyone
so the fork is not resolved. In this case, the uncle information stays
the same. However, if the next mined block is by an honest miner
who extends the miner’s chain. The fork is resolved and the public
advances by h blocks. In this case, all the uncles in uh are shifted
back by h, r ← 0 and ua ← 0. Also in this case, if ua was 1 before,
we give theminer a nephew reward aswell and add 1 to the difficulty
contribution in addition to h as described in the Bitcoin model.
As in Bitcoin, blocks, uncles and nephew rewards are counted
towards the reward and the difficulty contribution only if and when
they are agreed upon by both the rational miner and the rest of
the network. The one exception to this rule is when we count
the reward and difficulty contribution in advance in the case of
ua = 1. This complicates the model but reduces the number of
states significantly.
The model in [11, 12] captures the uncle information using both
a parameter similar to r and a ternary vector similar to uh in which
every element registers whether there is a possible uncle of the
rational miner, a possible uncle of an honest miner or no potential
uncle.
Counting the rational miner’s uncles in advance as in our model
reduces the state space size by a factor of 362·26 ≈ 5.7.
7.2 Results
Table 2 shows results of PTO for Ethereum for various α ’s and
maximum fork length of 20. We chose the expected horizon to
be H = 105 and used policy iteration with a stopping threshold
of 10−7.
Figure 6 gives a comparison between the results in Table 2 and
SquirRL. To do so, we used the code of SquirRL generously shared
with us by the authors [12]. SquirRL relies on Q-Learning with
value function approximation (with neural nets) and they used
Monte Carlo approximation to calculate the revenue of the policy
found. This only gives a confidence interval for the revenue of the
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Figure 6: Comparison between the results for Ethereum of
PTO and SquirRL with different α ’s and maximum fork
length of 20. The results of SquirRL are surrounded by a con-
fidence interval with a confidence of 0.99.
policy and not an exact number. This is still a good approximation
as seen in the tight confidence band in the figure.
As seen in the figure, PTO outperforms SquirRL for all cases.
Thanks to Theorem 2 we know that PTO converges to the optimum.
But, the difference between the results is also affected by the
slight differences in the model. Our model allows the rational miner
to reveal her first block of the private chain at any time she desires
in order for it to be counted as an uncle. In addition, in our model
the objective of the miner is the miner’s reward divided by the total
number of blocks counted towards the difficulty (blocks in the main
chain and uncles) rather than the miner’s relative revenue as was
used by [12]. SquirRL’s results in the figure represent the revenue
of the miner in our model using the policy obtained by SquirRL in
order to get a relevant comparison.
Note. Since Q-Learning with value function approximation is not
guaranteed to converge to the optimum, different runs of SquirRL
may give different policies. Figure 6 only shows the confidence
interval of one policy found and might not be reproducible.
Note. The state space in Ethereum is much larger than the state
space in Bitcoin and since the transition matrix is of size |S| × |S|,
it is too big to fit in the memory of a reasonably powerful server. In
order to overcome this, SquirRL used Q-Learning with value func-
tion approximation which does not require the transition matrix
explicitly. We used a different approach by using a sparse matrix.
Although the transition matrix is of a large size, the number of
possible transitions from each state is relatively small and does not
depend on the state size. This means that most of the entries in the
transition matrix are zeros and using a sparse matrix uses memory
linear in the size of the state space instead.
Power (α ) Revenue (REVARR), 20 Revenue (REVARR), 25
0.24 0.24 0.24
0.245 0.245 0.245
0.246 0.246 0.246
0.2467 0.2467 0.2467
0.2468 0.246 806 0.246 807
0.2469 0.246 928 0.246 928
0.247 0.247 050 0.247 050
Table 3: PTO results for EthereumwhenH = 106 and limiting
the maximum fork length to 20 or 25.
7.3 Security Threshold
Table 3 shows higher accuracy results for Ethereum for α ’s around
the security threshold with a maximum fork length of either 20
or 25. In order to obtain more accurate results, we chose expected
horizon to be H = 106 and a stopping threshold of 10−8.
The table shows that the new threshold found with PTO is 0.2468.
This is lower than previous upper bounds found which are approx-
imately 0.26 [8, 18].
The empirical analysis in Section 6.3.2 suggests that for smaller
values of α only small maximum fork lengths are necessary to
obtain a good approximation. This can also be seen in Table 3 as
increasing the fork length barely changed the results. Therefore,
we consider the threshold we found to be a good approximation.
8 CONCLUSION
We presented PTO: an efficient method to find optimal mining
strategies in PoW blockchains. PTO forms a probabilistically ter-
minating state machine that can be optimized directly to find the
desired strategy. We prove PTO is correct and bound its approxima-
tion error by O( 1H ). PTO is an order of magnitude more efficient
than the state of the art. We use it to calculate the security threshold
of Ethereum and reduce it from 0.26 [8, 10] to 0.2468.
PTO applies to any blockchain protocol that can be modeled as
an MDP with an ARR objective function. Due to its speed, it can be
used repeatedly to find more robust reward schemes with higher
security thresholds.
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A PROOFS
In this appendix we restate and prove all the deferred proofs from
section 5.
A.1 Expected Horizon lemma
The following lemma is a restatement of Lemma 5.
Lemma 10. The expected total contribution to the difficulty when
PT-MDP terminates is approximately equal to H . Formally, it holds
that:
H − Dmax − 1 ≤ E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
 ≤ H + Dmax .
Proof. We start by developing the expression of the probability
the process continues afterT ∈ N steps conditioned on the difficulty
contribution accumulated until T is z ∈ R+:
Pr
(
T < Term(H )
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
=
= Pr
(
X1 = X2 = ... = XT = 0
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
=
= E
[
Pr
(
X1 = ... = XT = 0
D1,D2, ...,Dt−1,Dt = z − T−1∑
t=1
Dt
)]
=
= E [Pr (X1 = 0|D1) · Pr (X2 = 0|D2) · ...
... · Pr (xT−1 = 0|DT−1) · Pr
(
xT = 0
Dt = z − T−1∑
t=1
Dt
)]
=
= E

(
1 − 1
H
)D1
· ... ·
(
1 − 1
H
)DT−1
·
(
1 − 1
H
)z−T−1∑
t=1
Dt
 =
= E
[(
1 − 1
H
)z ]
=
(
1 − 1
H
)z
. (1)
As for any t , Dt ≥ 0, the difficulty contribution up until the last
step before termination is more than some y ∈ R+:
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ y
happens iff there is someT < Term(H ) for which immediately after
step T the difficulty contribution surpasses y:
∃T ∈N :
T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H ) .
This gives:
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬ =
= Pr
(
∃T ∈N :
T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H )
)
.
By summing over all options of T ∈ N and then using the law of
total expectation, we get:
Pr
(
∃T ∈N :
T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H )
)
=
=
∞∑
T=1
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H )
)
=
=
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H )
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)]
.
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Once
T∑
t=1
Dt = z is determined, Term(H ) only depends on z and is
independent of
T−1∑
t=1
Dt . Therefore:
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬ =
=
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt ∧T < Term(H )
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)]
=
=
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
·
·Pr
(
T < Term(H )
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)]
.
Now by substituting (1) into this, we get:
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬ =
=
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
·
(
1 − 1
H
)z ]
.
(2)
Now, thanks to Assumption 2, we get:
T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤ z =
T∑
t=1
Dt =
T−1∑
t=1
Dt + Dmax < y + Dmax ,
y ≤ z < y + Dmax ,
and: (
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
<
(
1 − 1
H
)z
≤
(
1 − 1
H
)y
. (3)
Putting this back in (2):
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
·
(
1 − 1
H
)z ]
>
>
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)
·
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax ]
=
=
∞∑
T=1
E
[
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
 T∑
t=1
Dt = z
)]
·
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
=
=
∞∑
T=1
Pr
(T−1∑
t=1
Dt < y ≤
T∑
t=1
Dt
)
·
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
=
= Pr
(
∃T ∈N :
T∑
t=1
Dt ≥ y
)
︸                         ︷︷                         ︸
1
·
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
=
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
The probability is equal to 1 since if the game goes on forever the
difficulty contributions will accumulate enough to pass y thanks to
assumption 3. Overall, by using all the equations and inequalities
above: (
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
< Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬ . (4)
By using the upper bound from (3) similarly, it holds that:
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬ ≤
(
1 − 1
H
)y
. (5)
Now, calculating the expected difficulty contribution until
Term(H ) − 1 and bounding from above using (5), we get:
E

Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt
 =
∞∫
0
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬dy ≤
≤
∞∫
0
(
1 − 1
H
)y
dy =

1
ln
(
1 − 1H
) (1 − 1
H
)y
dy

∞
0
=
= − 1
ln
(
1 − 1H
) = H
−H · ln
(
1 − 1H
) = H
ln
((
1 − 1H
)−H ) ≤ ≤ Hln e = H .
(6)
And bounding from below using (4) as well, we get:
E

Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt
 =
∞∫
0
Pr ©­«
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≥ yª®¬dy ≥
≥
∞∫
0
(
1 − 1
H
)y+Dmax
dy
=
(
1 − 1
H
)Dmax
·

1
ln
(
1 − 1H
) (1 − 1
H
)y
dy

∞
0
=
= −
(
1 − 1H
)Dmax
ln
(
1 − 1H
) = (H − 1)
(
1 − 1H
)Dmax
−(H − 1) · ln
(
1 − 1H
) ≥
≥
(H − 1)
(
1 − DmaxH
)
ln
((
1 − 1H
)−H+1) ≥ H − 1 − Dmax + DmaxHln e ≥ H−Dmax−1 .
(7)
Now, trivially following by Assumption 2, notice that:
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt ≤
Term(H )∑
T=1
Dt <
Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt + Dmax .
We now use the equation above with the bounds previously found
(6) and (7) to bound the expectation from below:
E

Term(H )∑
T=1
Dt
 ≥ E

Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt
 ≥ H − Dmax − 1 ,
14
and above:
E

Term(H )∑
T=1
Dt
 ≤ E

Term(H )−1∑
T=1
Dt
 + Dmax ≤ H + Dmax .
Combining the previous two inequalities we get:
H − Dmax − 1 ≤ E

Term(H )∑
T=1
Dt
 ≤ H + Dmax . □
A.2 Bounding the Average Difference
We first state some important classical results for Markov chains [9,
20].
Lemma 11. [20] An irreducible Markov Chain has a positive distri-
bution if and only all of its states are positive recurrent. In that case,
the stationary distribution is unique and has the following form:
µi =
1
E [τi ] .
The following lemma gives a way to calculate the expected cu-
mulative sum of a random variable which depends on the current
state of the chain until some chosen state is entered.
Lemma 12. [20] Let Yn be an irreducible positive recurrent
Markov chain with stationary distribution µ. Suppose Vn , n ≥ 1, are
real-valued random variables associated with the chain such that
E [Vn |Y1,Y2, ...,Yn ] = aYn , n ≥ 1 ,
where aj are constants. Then, for the hitting time τi of a fixed state i ,
it holds that
E
[τi−1∑
n=1
Vn
T1 = i
]
=
1
µi
∑
j ∈S
aj µ j ,
provided the last sum is absolutely convergent.
Lemma 13. [20] For a fixed integer ℓ, the process Y˜n =
(Yn , ...,Yn+ℓ) is an ergodic Markov chain on Sℓ+1 with stationary
distribution
µ(i) = µi0pi0,i1 · · · piℓ−1,iℓ .
Hence, for f : Sℓ+1 → R,
lim
n→∞n
−1
n∑
m=1
f (Y˜m ) =
∑
i ∈Sℓ+1
f (i)µ(i) a.s.,
provided the sum is absolutely convergent.
This lemma is a generalization of Lemma 12. First, instead of a
random variable which depends on a single state, it allows using any
(deterministic) function of the last (ℓ + 1) states. This is a powerful
notion since it depends on multiple states instead of one. Second,
instead of a cumulative sum until entering a said state, it provides
the average of the function when the process runs indefinitely.
Lemma 14. [9] Let Y, and Y˜ be ergodic Markov chains with transi-
tion matrices P and P˜ and stationary distributions µ and µ˜ then:
∥µ − µ˜∥∞ = O
(P − P˜∞) .
We first restate the transition probabilities in PT-MDP.
Lemma 15. The transition probability of PT-MDP is:
P ′H (i, j) =

(
1 − 1H
)D(i, j)
P(i, j) + 1 −
(
1 − 1H
)D(i, j)
j = sterm(
1 − 1H
)D(i, j)
P(i, j) o.w
.
Proof. Follows immediately from the definition of PT-MDP. □
We now use the Lemma 14 to obtain a bound for the difference
between the stationary distributions of the 2 MDPs.
Lemma 16. The stationary distributions of ARR-MDP and PT-MDP
are equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally:µ − µ ′H ∞ = O ( 1H )
Proof. Using lemma 14, and the fact that the MDPs are ergodic
(Lemma 4) we get that:µ − µ ′H ∞ = O (P − P ′H ∞) . (8)
Using the definition of the infinity norm for matrices – the maxi-
mum column sum the absolute values of elements, we get:P − P ′H ∞ ≤ |S| maxi, j ∈S P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) . (9)
We will now prove that the last term is O
(
1
H
)
. There are 2 cases
from lemma 15. For the first case j = sterm we get:P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) =
=
P(i, j) − (1 − 1H )D(i, j) P(i, j) − 1 + (1 − 1H )D(i, j)
 =
=
(P(i, j) − 1)
(
1 −
(
1 − 1
H
)D(i, j)) ≤
≤ |P(i, j) − 1| ·
1 − (1 − 1H )Dmax
 .
Therefore for H ≫ Dmax it holds that:P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) ≤ |P(i, j) − 1| · 1 − (1 − DmaxH ) ≤
≤ |P(i, j) − 1| · Dmax
H
= O
(
1
H
)
. (10)
For the other case, we get similarly that j , sterm:P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) = P(i, j) − (1 − 1H )D(i, j) P(i, j)

=
P(i, j) − (1 − 1H )D(i, j) P(i, j)
 = |P(i, j)|
1 − (1 − 1H )D(i, j)
 =
= O
(
1
H
)
. (11)
By plugging (10) and (11) in (9) we get that:P − P ′H ∞ ≤ |S| maxi, j ∈S P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) = |S|O ( 1H ) = O ( 1H ) .
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Plugging this in (8) to obtain:µ − µ ′H ∞ = O (P − P ′H ∞) = O ( 1H ) . □
Next, we have 2 similar lemmas which bound the difference
between the rewards and difficulty contributions in every state in
both MDPs.
Lemma 17. The rewards in every step of ARR-MDP and PT-MDP
are equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally:Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ = O ( 1H ) .
Proof. Remember the definitions of Rˆ and Rˆ′H :
Rˆ(i) =
∑
j ∈S
R(i, j)P(i, j) ,
and
Rˆ′H (i) =
∑
j ∈S
R(i, j)P ′H (i, j) .
We use these to develop our expression and obtain:
Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ = maxi ∈S
∑j ∈S R(i, j)P(i, j) −
∑
j ∈S
R(i, j)P ′H (i, j)
 =
= max
i ∈S
∑j ∈S R(i, j) (P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j))
 .
By using Assumption 1 and the triangle inequality we get that:Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ ≤ Rmax ·maxi ∈S ∑
j ∈S
P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) . (12)
By using equations (10) and (11) inside the proof of Lemma 16, we
see that: P(i, j) − P ′H (i, j) = O ( 1H ) .
We use this to bound the expression in (12), and obtain:Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ ≤ Rmax ·maxi ∈S |S| ·O ( 1H ) = O ( 1H ) . □
Lemma 18. The difficulty contributions in every step of ARR-MDP
and PT-MDP are equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally:Dˆ − Dˆ ′H ∞ = O ( 1H ) .
Proof. Same proof as lemma 17 but with Dˆ and Dˆ ′H instead of
Rˆ and Rˆ′H . □
Now, we will use the previous 2 lemmas to prove Lemma 6. We
first restate the lemma.
Lemma 19. The expected reward per step of ARR-MDP and
PT-MDP are equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it holds that:⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = O ( 1H ) .
Furthermore, The expected difficulty contribution per step of
ARR-MDP and PT-MDP are also equal up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it
holds that: ⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = O ( 1H ) .
Proof. We begin by developing the the difference in the ex-
pected reward between ARR-MDP and PT-MDP to obtain:⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = ⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ, µ ′H ⟩ + ⟨Rˆ, µ ′H ⟩ + ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ =
=
⟨Rˆ, µ − µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ − Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ .
By using the triangle inequality and Cauchy-Schwarz inequality,
we get that:⟨Rˆ, µ − µ ′H ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ − Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ ≤ ⟨Rˆ, µ − µ ′H ⟩+⟨Rˆ − Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ ≤
≤ Rˆ2 · µ − µ ′H 2 + Rˆ − Rˆ′H 2 · . µ ′H 2
Under a finite state space, the L2 norm and L∞ are asymptotically
equivalent so for any x it holds that:®x2 = O (®x∞) .
We use this to obtain:⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ ≤ Rˆ2 · µ − µ ′H 2 + Rˆ − Rˆ′H 2 · µ ′H 2 ≤
≤ O
(Rˆ∞ · µ − µ ′H ∞ + Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ · µ ′H ∞) .
Then, by using Assumption 1, the fact that a stationary distribution
is comprised of probabilities (≤ 1) and Lemmas 17 and 18, we get:
O
(Rˆ∞ · µ − µ ′H ∞ + Rˆ − Rˆ′H ∞ · µ ′H ∞) ≤
≤ O
(
Rmax ·O
(
1
H
)
+O
(
1
H
)
· 1
)
= O
(
1
H
)
.
We combine all the previous inequalities and get that:⟨Rˆ, µ⟩ − ⟨Rˆ′H , µ ′H ⟩ = O ( 1H ) .
The exact with Dˆ and Dˆ ′H instead of Rˆ and Rˆ
′
H gives the second
result. □
Now we restate and prove Lemma 7.
Lemma 20. The average difficulty contribution per step in
ARR-MDP and PT-MDP is more than some constant ε > 0. Formally,
it holds that
⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ > ε ,
and
⟨Dˆ ′H , µ ′H ⟩ > ε .
Proof. The first part of this proof is a directly corollary of the
ergodicity and Assumption 3.
To prove the second part of the lemma we use the second part
of Lemma 19 and the first part of this lemma to get:
⟨Dˆ ′H , µ⟩ > ε −O
(
1
H
)
.
For H ≫ Dmax, there is some constant ε ′ > 0 such that:
⟨Dˆ ′H , µ⟩ > ε ′ .
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To ease notation, since all we care about is that there is a lower
bound we redefine ε to be minimum of the previous value of ε and
the value of ε’. □
A.3 Simplifying the Revenues
In the following we restate and prove Lemmas 8 and 9.
Lemma 21. The revenue in ARR-MDP is equal to the average ex-
pected reward per step divided by the average expected difficulty
contribution per step. Formally, it holds that:
REVARR =
⟨Rˆ, µ⟩
⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ .
Proof. Recall from the definition REVARR that:
REVARR = E

lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Rt
T∑
t=1
Dt

.
We first analyze the expression within the expectation and get:
lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Rt
T∑
t=1
Dt
=
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Rt
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt
. (13)
This equality is true only if both limits are well defined and the
denominator is not 0. We will see that this is indeed the case after
fully developing this expression.
Now, using Lemma 13 with ℓ = 1 when choosing:
f : (Xt ,Xt+1) 7→ R(Xt ,Xt+1) ,
for the nominator and:
f : (Xt ,Xt+1) 7→ D(Xt ,Xt+1) ,
for the denominator, we get that:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Rt =
∑
(i, j)∈S2
R(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j) ,
and:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt =
∑
(i, j)∈S2
D(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j) .
Then after substituting the above terms in (13) and then taking the
sums apart, we get:
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Rt
lim
T→∞
1
T
T∑
t=1
Dt
=
∑
(i, j)∈S2
R(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j)∑
(i, j)∈S2
D(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j) =
=
∑
i ∈s
∑
j ∈s
R(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j)∑
i ∈s
∑
j ∈s
D(i, j)µ(i)P(i, j) =
∑
i ∈s
Rˆ(i)µ(i)∑
i ∈s
Dˆ(i)µ(i) .
Then, by combining all the previous equations, we get that:
REVARR = E

lim
T→∞
T∑
t=1
Rt
T∑
t=1
Dt

= E

∑
i ∈s
Rˆ(i)µ(i)∑
i ∈s
Dˆ(i)µ(i)
 .
Since the expression in the last expectation is constant, its expecta-
tion is itself. We use that to obtain:
REVARR =
∑
i ∈s
Rˆ(i)µ(i)∑
i ∈s
Dˆ(i)µ(i) =
⟨Rˆ, µ⟩
⟨Dˆ, µ⟩ . □
Lemma 22. The revenue in PT-MDP is equal to the average expected
reward per step divided by the average expected difficulty contribution
per step up to O
(
1
H
)
. Formally, it holds that:
REVPT − ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩
 = O ( 1H ) .
Proof. From the definition of REVPT and from the lower bound
in Lemma 10, we lower bound the fraction in the expression:
REVPT =
1
H
E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
 ≥
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
]
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
]
+ Dmax + 1
.
Note that:
(1) (Term(H ) + 1) is the hitting time of sterm and
(2) in PT-MDP, E [Rt |Xt = i] = Rˆ′H (i) and E [Dt |Xt = i] =
Dˆ ′H (i).
Therefore Lemma 12 can be used twice (once in the nominator and
once in the denominator) to obtain:
REVPT ≥
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
]
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
]
+ Dmax + 1
=
=
(µ ′H (sterm))−1
∑
i ∈S
Rˆ′H (i)µ ′H (i)
(µ ′H (sterm))−1
∑
i ∈S
Dˆ ′H (i)µ ′H (i) + Dmax + 1
=
=
⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + (Dmax + 1)µ ′H (sterm)
. (14)
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By using the upper bound in Lemma 10, and then continuing simi-
larly, we get:
REVPT =
1
H
E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
 ≤
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Rt
]
E
[
Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
]
− Dmax
=
=
(µ ′H (sterm))−1
∑
i ∈S
Rˆ′H (i)µ ′H (i)
(µ ′H (sterm))−1
∑
i ∈S
Dˆ ′H (i)µ ′H (i) − Dmax
=
=
⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmaxµ ′H (sterm)
(15)
As stated before, (Term(H )+1) is the hitting time of sterm. So, thanks
to Lemma 11, it holds that:
µ ′H (sterm) =
1
E [Term(H ) + 1] .
By using Assumption 2 and Lemma 10, we get:
Dmax · E [Term(H )] ≥ E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Dmax
 ≥
≥ E

Term(H )∑
t=1
Dt
 ≥ H − Dmax − 1 .
We proceed to lower bound µ ′H (sterm). We get:
E [Term(H )] ≥ H − Dmax − 1
Dmax
=
H − 1
Dmax
− 1 .
and:
µ ′H (sterm) ≤
1
H−1
Dmax
=
Dmax
H − 1 .
Plugging this into (14) yields:
REVPT ≥
⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + (Dmax + 1)µ ′H (sterm)
≥ ⟨Rˆ
′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
.
(16)
And, plugging the lower bound into (15) yields:
REVPT ≤
⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmaxµ ′H (sterm)
≤ ⟨Rˆ
′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax
2
H−1
. (17)
By using both bounds (16) and (17) and noticing that the desired
ratio also lies within the bounds we get that:REVPT − ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩
 ≤
≤
 ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax2H−1 −
⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
 ≤
≤

⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩ ·
(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
)
− ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩ ·
(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax
2
H−1
)(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
)
·
(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax
2
H−1
)
 ≤
≤
 ⟨Rˆ
′, µ ′H ⟩ · 2Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
)
·
(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax
2
H−1
)
 .
When taking into consideration H ≫ Dmax and using Lemma 20,
we get that: ⟨Rˆ
′, µ ′H ⟩ · 2Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ + Dmax
2+Dmax
H−1
)
·
(
⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩ − Dmax
2
H−1
)
 <
< ε−2 · ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩ ·
2Dmax2 + Dmax
H − 1
Together with Assumption 1 and the property that a stationary
distribution sums to 1, we obtain:
ε−2 · ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩ ·
2Dmax2 + Dmax
H − 1 ≤
3Dmax2 · ε−2 · Rmax
H − 1 = O
(
1
H
)
.
We combine all the previous inequalities to finally derive:REVPT − ⟨Rˆ′, µ ′H ⟩⟨Dˆ ′, µ ′H ⟩
 = O ( 1H ) . □
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